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equitable principles. Initially, the court must identify the alleged
wrongful conduct and determine if it warrants a sanction. The
court must explain its reasons clearly on the record if it decides a
sanction is appropriate. To determine what will constitute an
appropriate sanction, the court may consider the seriousness of the
conduct, the impact the conduct had in the case and in the
administration of justice, any mitigating circumstances, and
whether the conduct was an isolated occurrence or was a pattern of
wrongdoing throughout the case.2 6
VI. DOMESTIC RELATIONS
A.

Domestic Violence

In a forceful and committed tone, Justice Cleckley wrote in the case of In
re Browning 7 that "[d]omestic violence cases are among those that our courts must
give priority status. In W. Va. Code, 48-2A-1, et seq., the West Virginia Legislature
took steps to ensure that these cases are handled both effectively and efficiently by
law enforcement agencies and the judicial system. ' The Browningopinion set out
guidelines for courts to follow in issuing domestic violence protective orders, when
a court may be disqualified from addressing the matter:
Magistrates are statutorily required to provide an individual with
any assistance necessary to complete a petition for a protective
order. Once the petition is completed, the magistrate must file the
petition and, upon a showing of sufficient facts, issue a protective
order. If a magistrate believes that she or he is disqualified from
handling the matter, the magistrate must examine carefully whether
the rule of necessity applies. Under no circumstances should a
victim of abuse be turned away from a magistrate or a circuit judge
without ensuring the victim will receive prompt attention by
another magistrate or judge. 9
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Divorce

Marital and separate property were addressed by Justice Cleckley in
Burnside v. Burnside:24 °
When a spouse uses separate property to retire the mortgage of
property titled jointly, a gift to the marital estate is presumed. This
presumption is rebuttable only by clear, cogent, and convincing
evidence that a gift was not intended or that the transaction under
scrutiny was the result of coercion, duress, or deception.2 4 '
Justice Cleckley cautioned that
[t]he presumption of a gift to the marital estate may not be rebutted
by evidence that merely reflects the motivation for making the gift
or an uncommunicated and subjective state of mind of the
transferring spouse or that, when viewed alone, can be considered
inconsistent with the intent to maintain the property as separate.242
Justice Cleckley profoundly impacted the issue of alimony in the case of
Banker v. Banker.2 43 Banker held that
[u]nder W. Va. Code, 48-2-15(e) (1993), a circuit court has
jurisdiction to hear and rule upon a motion seeking modification of
a decree to include alimony, as the ends ofjustice may so require,
even though the decree previously denied alimony or did not
address the issue of alimony. To the extent that Savage v. Savage,
157 W. Va. 537, 203 S.E.2d 151 (1974), and its progeny are
inconsistent, they are expressly overruled.2"
Justice Cleckley tempered the reach of his decision on alimony:
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When a party to a divorce action neglects to assert a claim of
alimony for an unreasonable and unexplained length of time and
other circumstances cause prejudice to the adverse party, relief
should be denied on the grounds of laches. However, the mere
lapse of time is not enough to invoke the doctrine. For laches to
apply, the circuit court must consider the circumstances
surrounding the delay and any disadvantage and prejudice to the
other party caused by the delay.245
C.

ChildAbuse andNeglect

The case of In re ChristinaL.2' required Justice Cleckley to elaborate upon
several issues under the state's civil abuse and neglect statutes. First, the opinion
expanded the meaning of abused child under the state's civil abuse and neglect
statutes:
Where there is clear and convincing evidence that a child has
suffered physical and/or sexual abuse while in the custody of his
or her parent(s), guardian, or custodian, another child residing in
the home when the abuse took place who is not a direct victim of
the physical and/or sexual abuse but is at risk of being abused is an
abused child under W. Va. Code, 49-1-3(a) (1994).247
The next issue addressed in ChristinaL. involved procedural requirements
for terminating parental rights due to civil abuse or neglect. The opinion held that
"[w]hen the West Virginia Department of Health and Human Resources seeks to
terminate parental rights where an absent parent has abandoned the child,
allegations of such abandonment should be included in the petition and every effort
made to comply with the notice requirements of W. Va. Code, 49-6-1 (1992). "248
The final issue Justice Cleckley touched upon in ChristinaL. involved visitation
between a child and the parent whose rights were terminated:
When parental rights are terminated due to neglect or abuse, the
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circuit court may nevertheless in appropriate cases consider
whether continued visitation or other contact with the abusing
parent is in the best interest of the child. Among other things, the
circuit court should consider whether a close emotional bond has
been established between parent and child and the child's wishes,
if he or she is of appropriate maturity to make such request. The
evidence must indicate that such visitation or continued contact
would not be detrimental to the child's well being and would be in
249
the child's best interest.
D.

Paternity

The case of Mildred L.M. v. John O.F.250 permitted Justice Cleckley to
address issues involving paternity. The opinion held that "[u]nder W. Va. Code,
48A-6-3 (1992), undisputed blood or tissue test results indicating a statistical
probability of paternity of more than ninety-eight percent are conclusive on the
issue of paternity, and the circuit court should enter judgment accordingly."' It
was also held that:
[w]here the foundation is sufficient to show by a preponderance of
the evidence the proper testing procedures were employed and the
expert witness who interpreted the test results was qualified, courts
may take judicial notice of the accuracy and reliability of HLA
blood-tissue test results introduced in paternity cases pursuant to
W. Va. Code, 48A-6-3 (1992).2
The case of State ex rel.Roy Allen S. v. Stone 3 afforded Justice Cleckley
an additional opportunity to address paternity issues. The opinion laid down initial
procedural guidelines in a paternity action:
When a putative biological father raises a paternity claim, the child
must be joined and a guardian ad litem appointed. The circuit
249
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court should conduct a preliminary hearing to determine whether
the requisite preconditions are present. In addition, the preeminent
factor in deciding whether to grant or deny blood testing is the
child's best interests. The analysis of each factual situation is
necessarily a discretionary decision for the circuit court, and the
finding by the circuit court will not be reversed absefit an abuse of
discretion.'
The opinion then addressed the specific situation involving a child who was
born while the mother was married to someone other than the putative biological
father:
In the absence of special circumstances which would justify an
exception, a petition by a putative biological father seeking to
establish his paternity over a child who was born while the mother
was married to another man may not proceed unless the putative
father clearly and convincingly proves as a threshold matter that he
has established a substantial paternal relationship with the child.
The putative father's showing need not be made, however, if no
person or party (named or intervening and including the guardian
ad litem ) contests the petition."
Finally, the opinion held,
[a] putative biological father must prove by clear and convincing
evidence the following factors before he will have standing to raise
the issue of paternity of a child born to a married woman who is
not his wife: (1) that he has developed a parent-child relationship
with the child in question, and (2) that the child will not be harmed
by allowing the paternity action to proceed."
E.

ChildCustody
In the case of West VirginiaDepartmentof Health andHuman Resources
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ex rel. Wright v. David L.,Y the West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals had to
determine whether a parent seeking child custody may authorize, on behalf of the
children, the secret recording of the children's conversations. Justice Cleckley
ruled that "[a] parent has no right on behalf of his or her children to give consent
under W. Va. Code, 62-1D-3(c)(2) (1987), or 18 U.S.C. § 251 1(2)(d) (1988) to have
the children's conversations with the other parent recorded while the children are
in the other parent's house."' s
The issue of child custody under the federal Parental Kidnaping Prevention
Act (the "Act") was the central focus in Sheila L. on Behalf of Ronald MM v.
Ronald P.Mz 9 As an initial matter, Justice Cleckley held that "[e]mergency
custody matters should be among those cases given priority by our court systems
'
and should be resolved as quickly as is reasonably feasible."26
The opinion in SheilaL. then explained the basis for jurisdiction under the
Act:
Under the Parental Kidnaping Prevention Act of 1980, 28 U.S.C.
§ 173 8A(d), a court may continue its jurisdiction if it has made a
child custody determination consistent with the provisions of this
section, if it maintains jurisdiction under its law, and if either the
child or a contestant continues to reside in the state. A custody
determination is defined in 28 U.S.C. § 1738A(b)(3) as ajudgment,
decree, or other order of a court providing for the custody or
visitation of a child, and includes permanent and temporary orders,
and initial orders and modifications.2 6'
Additionally, it was said that
[tio assume jurisdiction in an emergency situation under the
Parental Kidnaping Prevention Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1738A(c)(1) and
(2)(C), a state must have jurisdiction under its own law, the child
must be physically present in the state, and the child must be either
abandoned or in an emergency situation that necessitates action to
257
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protect the child being subjected to or threatened with
mistreatment or abuse.262
The opinion noted that
[u]nsubstantiated statements of a parent that a child is being
subjected to or threatened with mistreatment or abuse, by
themselves, cannot serve as a basis to invoke jurisdiction of a court
to enter or modify a permanent custody award under the Parental
Kidnaping.Prevention Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1738A(c). A parent is not
precluded merely because of unsubstantiated statements from
raising allegations of mistreatment or abuse in a court that has
jurisdiction to enter or modify a permanent custody award on other
grounds; nor is that court prevented from considering such
unsubstantiated statements in entering a temporary order to protect
a child from an emergency situation of abuse. 63
Justice Cleckley then addressed the issue of a court taking emergency
jurisdiction over a child under the Act:
It is consistent with the intent of the Parental Kidnaping Prevention
Act of 1980, 28 U.S.C. § 173 8A, that a court without jurisdiction
on other grounds may invoke temporary emergency jurisdiction if
its exercise ofjurisdiction is consistent with the laws of the state
where the court is located, the child is physically present in that
state, and the child is in need of protection as a result of being
subjected to or threatened with mistreatment or abuse. 28 U.S.C.
§ 1738A(c)(1) and (2)(C).2 "
Justice Cleckley concluded in Sheila L. that
[i]f emergency jurisdiction is based upon the unsubstantiated
statements of a parent, additional evidence should be gathered as
quickly as reasonably possible to either affirm or negate the
allegations. Temporary jurisdiction should last only so long as the
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emergency exists or until a court that has jurisdiction to enter or
modify a permanent custody award is apprised of the situation and
accepts responsibility to ensure that the child is protected.265
F.

CircuitCourtReview of Family Law MasterRecommendation

The case of Stephen L.H. v. Sherry L.H.266 afforded Justice Cleckley a
chance to clarify the review posture circuit courts must take in examining findings
of fact by family law masters. The first task was to discern legislative intent in the
use of the phrases "abuse of discretion" and "unsupported by substantial evidence,"
as those terms were used by statute to describe review of family law master findings
by circuit courts:
When the Legislature enacts laws, it is presumed to be aware of all
pertinentjudgments rendered by the judicial branch. By borrowing
terms of art in which are accumulated the legal tradition and
meaning of centuries of practice, the Legislature presumably
knows and adopts the cluster of ideas attached to each borrowed
word in the body of learning from which it was taken and the
meaning its use will convey to the judicial mind unless otherwise
instructed. When the Legislature enacted W. Va. Code,
48A-4-20(c) (1993), it intended the phrases "abuse of discretion"
and "unsupported by substantial evidence" as used in this section
to encompass the entire panoply of definitions which the judicial
branch had previously ascribed to those terms.267
The opinion ruled that "[a] circuit court should review findings of fact made
by a family law master only under a clearly erroneous standard, and it should review
the application of law to the facts under an abuse of discretion standard."26 Justice
Cleckley elaborated upon the clearly erroneous standard by stating that "[u]nder the
clearly erroneous standard, if the findings of fact and the inferences drawn by a
family law master are supported by substantial evidence, such findings and
inferences may not be overturned even if a circuit court may be inclined to make
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different findings or draw contrary inferences."269 The opinion concluded,
[i]f a circuit court believes a family law master failed to make
findings of fact essential to the proper resolution of a legal
question, it should remand the case to the family law master to
make those findings. If it is of the view that the findings of fact of
a family law master were clearly erroneous, the circuit court may
set those findings aside on that basis. If it believes the findings of
fact of the family law master are unassailable, but the proper rule
of law was misapplied to those findings, the circuit court may
reverse. However, a circuit court may not substitute its own
findings of fact for those of a family law master merely because it
disagrees with those findings.27
VII. PROPERTY LAW

A.

Government Sale of Property

The sale of property by the division of highways pursuant to W. Va. Code
section 17-2A-19 was the subject in Mills v. Van Kirk.27 ' Justice Cleckley's
interpretation of the statute provided:
Applying the plain language of the statute, abutting landowners
must receive preferential treatment when purchasing state property
pursuant to W.Va. Code, 17-2A-19 (1988). Under this statutory
scheme, the Commissioner has the right to decide whether turnpike
and railway property will be useful in the present or foreseeable
future. Once this decision is made, the statute directs the
Commissioner to first offer the property to the abutting landowners
for fair market value.272
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